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dc.contributor.authorZhang, Pingen
dc.date.accessioned2011-09-26T13:24:04Z-
dc.date.available2011-09-26T13:24:04Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/49671-
dc.description.abstractWe characterize pure strategy equilibria of common value multi-unit uniform price auctions under the framework of initial public offerings, where bidders have incomplete private information regarding the value of shares and submit discrete demand schedules. We show that there exists a continuum of equilibria where investors with a higher expectation about the value of shares bid for higher quantities at higher prices, and as a result the market price increases with the market value. The collusive equilibria, in which investors place bids regardless of their expectation about the value, are obtained under stricter conditions than in the continuous price case.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aThe University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx) |cNottinghamen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCeDEx Discussion Paper Series |x2009-05en
dc.subject.jelD44en
dc.subject.jelG12en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordIPO, uniform price auctionen
dc.subject.keyworddivisible goods auctionen
dc.subject.keywordshare auctionen
dc.subject.keywordtacit collusionen
dc.subject.stwWertpapieremissionen
dc.subject.stwAuktionstheorieen
dc.subject.stwAsymmetrische Informationen
dc.subject.stwCapital Asset Pricing Modelen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleCharacterization of pure strategy equilibria in uniform price IPO auctions-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn594933692en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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