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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2008
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CeDEx Discussion Paper Series No. 2008-17
Verlag: 
The University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx), Nottingham
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper reports experimental tests of two alternative explanations of how players use focal points to select equilibria in one-shot coordination games. Cognitive hierarchy theory explains coordination as the result of common beliefs about players' pre-reflective inclinations towards the relevant strategies; the theory of team reasoning explains it as the result of the players' using a non-standard form of reasoning. We report two experiments. One finds strong support for team reasoning; the other supports cognitive hierarchy theory. In the light of additional questionnaire evidence, we conclude that players' reasoning is sensitive to the decision context.
Schlagwörter: 
salience
focal point
cognitive hierarchy
team reasoning
JEL: 
C72
C92
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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