Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/49657 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2010
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CeDEx Discussion Paper Series No. 2010-03
Verlag: 
The University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx), Nottingham
Zusammenfassung: 
This study uses a three-person gift-exchange game experiment to examine the impact of pay comparisons on effort behavior. We compare effort choices made in a treatment where workers' wages are secret with effort choices made in two 'public wages' treatments. The two 'public wages' treatments differ in whether co-workers' wages are chosen by an employer, or are fixed exogenously by the experimenter. We find that pay comparison information has an overall detrimental impact on effort choices: employees respond less favorably to the wage offers made by the employer when they receive information about the wage paid to the co-worker as compared to the case where co-workers' wages are secret. These effects are particularly pronounced in the treatment where the level of the co-worker's wage is fixed exogenously.
Schlagwörter: 
social comparisons
wage comparisons
gift exchange
experiments
JEL: 
C91
C92
J31
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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