Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/49388 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2011
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Kiel Working Paper No. 1732
Verlag: 
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW), Kiel
Zusammenfassung: 
Recent research has shown that agreements centered on the adoption of breakthrough technologies can break the deadlock in international climate negotiations if the mitigation technology exhibits a network externality that transforms full cooperation into a self-enforcing outcome. This paper shows that the same externality also increases strategic uncertainty about future technology adoption, which makes coordination on the cooperative outcome more demanding. We analyze this coordination problem in a dynamic game of technology adoption with convex switching costs. We find that the adoption dynamics for some technologies depend exclusively on countries' expectations about future adoption. This possibility calls for a more prominent role of expectation management in climate policy. Another implication is that the choice of breakthrough technologies should be guided not only by economic efficiency and strategic adoption incentives but also by the amount of strategic uncertainty they engender.
Schlagwörter: 
International environmental agreements (IEAs)
climate policy
technology choice
expectations
multiple equilibria
JEL: 
Q54
O33
H87
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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