Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/48935 
Year of Publication: 
1998
Series/Report no.: 
Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Diskussionspapiere No. 14/1998
Publisher: 
Universität Greifswald, Rechts- und Staatswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Greifswald
Abstract: 
If one of two rational players is absent-minded for at least three rounds, cooperation in a prisoners dilemma with a finite number of repetitions is possible. If both players are absentminded, even two rounds of absent-mindedness can be enough for cooperation in these rounds and all rounds before. Sufficient conditions for the existence of a cooperative equilibrium are derived, a plausible interpretation of absent-mindedness in the case of many repetitions is given.
Subjects: 
absent-mindedness
prisoners dilemma
repeated games
JEL: 
C72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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