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dc.contributor.authorKragl, Jennyen
dc.contributor.authorSchöttner, Anjaen
dc.date.accessioned2011-08-12T09:51:42Z-
dc.date.available2011-08-12T09:51:42Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/48731-
dc.description.abstractWe analyze the effects of lower bounds on wages, e.g., minimum wages or liability limits, on job design within firms. In our model, two tasks contribute to non-verifiable firm value and affect an imperfect performance measure. The tasks can be assigned to either one or two agents. In the absence of a wage floor, it is optimal to assign the tasks to different agents whenever the agents' reservation utility is not too large. Under such a job design, the principal can tailor incentives according to each task's marginal productivity. By contrast, with a relatively large wage floor, the principal gradually lowers effort incentives to avoid rent payments to the agents, even before the wage floor exceeds the agents' reservation utility. If the wage floor is sufficiently large, the principal hires only one agent even though this leads to a distortion of effort across tasks or the non-execution of one task altogether.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft |xKiel und Hamburgen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBeiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2011: Die Ordnung der Weltwirtschaft: Lektionen aus der Krise - Session: Motivating Workers |xA7-V3en
dc.subject.jelM52en
dc.subject.jelM54en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordJob Designen
dc.subject.keywordMoral Hazarden
dc.subject.keywordMultitaskingen
dc.subject.keywordWage Flooren
dc.subject.keywordMinimum Wageen
dc.subject.keywordLimited Liabilityen
dc.titleWage Floors and Optimal Job Design-
dc.typeConference Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn671642650en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:vfsc11:48731en

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