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Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Gall, Thomas | en |
dc.contributor.author | Masella, Paolo | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2011-07-15T14:21:48Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2011-07-15T14:21:48Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2011 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/48350 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Economic institutions determine prospects for growth and development. This paper examines necessary conditions for an economy to support institutions that implement markets. Agents differ in land holdings, skill, and power. A competitive market assigns land to the skilled, not necessarily to the powerful. Therefore a market allocation needs to be robust to coalitional expropriation. In a dynamic setting, market payoffs may induce sufficient inequality in next period's endowments for markets to alternate with expropriation in a limit cycle, decreasing efficiency and amplifying macroeconomic fluctuations. Long run stability of markets is favored by higher social mobility, more initial equality, and less mismatch between demand and supply. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft |cKiel und Hamburg | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aProceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Berlin 2011 |x30 | en |
dc.subject.jel | E02 | en |
dc.subject.jel | O43 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C71 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Expropriation | en |
dc.subject.keyword | market institutions | en |
dc.subject.keyword | inequality | en |
dc.subject.keyword | fluctuations | en |
dc.subject.keyword | coalition formation | en |
dc.title | Markets and Jungles | - |
dc.type | Conference Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 66532698X | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
dc.identifier.repec | RePEc:zbw:gdec11:30 | en |
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