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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2008
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Memorandum No. 2008,12
Verlag: 
University of Oslo, Department of Economics, Oslo
Zusammenfassung: 
Competition authorities must pay attention to many industries simultaneously. Sectoral regulators concentrate on their own industry. Often both types of authority may intervene in specific industries and there is an overlap of jurisdictions. We show how a competition authority's resource allocation is affected by its relationships with sectoral regulators and their biases. If agencies collaborate (compete), the competition authority spends more effort on the industry with the more (less) consumer-biased sectoral regulator. The competition authority spends budget increases on the industry whose regulator reacts less to more effort. The socially optimal budget corrects for distortions due to regulatory bias, but only downwards.
Schlagwörter: 
Competition authority
Sectoral regulators
Regulatory bias
JEL: 
H11
L40
L51
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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