Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/47295 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2010
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Memorandum No. 2010,08
Verlag: 
University of Oslo, Department of Economics, Oslo
Zusammenfassung: 
I consider a society with heterogeneous individuals who can form organizations for the production of a differentiated service. An arrangement of organizations is said to be split up stable when there is no majority to split any of the organizations. Unlike other equilibrium concepts in the literature, the largest number of organizations that is split up stable corresponds to the socially optimal number of organizations, with a possibility of over provision of one organization. The analysis is extended to a case with endogeneous membership, where it is shown that the results remain the same.
Schlagwörter: 
Organizations
public goods
split up stability
efficiency
endogenous membership
JEL: 
D71
D73
H49
L31
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
390.14 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.