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dc.contributor.authorStähler, Franken
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-30T15:06:13Z-
dc.date.available2011-06-30T15:06:13Z-
dc.date.issued1993-
dc.identifier.citation|nInstitut für Weltwirtschaft (IfW) |lKiel |y1993en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/46933-
dc.description.abstractThis paper demonstrates that partial cooperation with respect to the use of an international environmental resource can emerge when countries are able to opt to breach an agreement. Although the option of non-compliance restricts the set of coalitions on those which embrace merely two members, broader cooperation can emerge when these two countries compensate a third country for extra reduction efforts. The paper discusses also a reversible and- a irreversible technology option and demonstrates that compensating a third country for the introduction of an irreversible technology may be even advantageous for the donors when this technology incurs higher costs than a reversible one.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aKiel Institute of World Economics (IfW) |cKielen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aKiel Working Paper |x600en
dc.subject.jelQ20en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.stwUmweltabkommenen
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungstheorieen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleOn the economics of international environmental agreements-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:ifwkwp:600en
dc.identifier.printppn257084347en
dc.date.issuedonline2011en
dc.publisher.online|aZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft |cKiel, Hamburgen
econstor.documentversionDigitized Versionen
econstor.citation.publisherInstitut für Weltwirtschaft (IfW)en
econstor.citation.publisherplaceKielen
econstor.citation.year1993en

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