Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Stähler, Frank
Year of Publication: 
Series/Report no.: 
Kiel Working Paper 600
This paper demonstrates that partial cooperation with respect to the use of an international environmental resource can emerge when countries are able to opt to breach an agreement. Although the option of non-compliance restricts the set of coalitions on those which embrace merely two members, broader cooperation can emerge when these two countries compensate a third country for extra reduction efforts. The paper discusses also a reversible and- a irreversible technology option and demonstrates that compensating a third country for the introduction of an irreversible technology may be even advantageous for the donors when this technology incurs higher costs than a reversible one.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
713.06 kB

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.