Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/46727 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
1995
Quellenangabe: 
[Publisher:] Institut für Weltwirtschaft (IfW) [Place:] Kiel [Year:] 1995
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Kiel Working Paper No. 705
Verlag: 
Kiel Institute of World Economics (IfW), Kiel
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper analyzes the GATT negotiations during the Uruguay Round and shows that France was induced to accept a more free trade oriented package due to her integration into the European community. The importance of the European economic and diplomatic relationships led France to accept a GATT deal which she felt would be disadvantageous. Further, the paper investigates how this finding fits into the literature of the political economy of trade policy and how it can be incorporated into a game theoretic model of endogenous tariff making.
Schlagwörter: 
Regionalism
Uruguay Round
European Union
Tariffs
Bargaining Model
JEL: 
C78
F13
F15
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
Dokumentversion: 
Digitized Version

Datei(en):
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