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dc.contributor.authorLehmann, Etienneen
dc.contributor.authorParmentier, Alexisen
dc.contributor.authorvan der Linden, Brunoen
dc.date.accessioned2011-05-18-
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-29T11:20:57Z-
dc.date.available2011-06-29T11:20:57Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/46538-
dc.description.abstractWe characterize optimal redistributive taxation when individuals are heterogeneous in their skills and their values of non-market activities. Search-matching frictions on the labor markets create unemployment. Wages, labor demand and participation are endogenous. Average tax rates are increasing at the optimum. This shifts wages below their laissez faire value and distorts labor demand upwards. The marginal tax rate is positive at the top of the skill distribution even when the latter is bounded. These results are analytically shown under a Maximin objective when the elasticity of participation is decreasing in the skill level and are numerically confirmed under a more general objective.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x3324en
dc.subject.jelH21en
dc.subject.jelH23en
dc.subject.jelJ64en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordnon-linear taxationen
dc.subject.keywordredistributionen
dc.subject.keywordadverse selectionen
dc.subject.keywordrandom participationen
dc.subject.keywordunemploymenten
dc.subject.keywordlabor market frictionsen
dc.subject.stwOptimale Besteuerungen
dc.subject.stwEinkommensteueren
dc.subject.stwSteuerprogressionen
dc.subject.stwFriktionelle Arbeitslosigkeiten
dc.subject.stwArbeitslosigkeiten
dc.subject.stwLohnniveauen
dc.subject.stwAdverse Selectionen
dc.subject.stwArbeitsmarkttheorieen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleOptimal income taxation with endogenous participation and search unemployment-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn659080648en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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