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dc.contributor.authorMoreno-Bromberg, Santiagoen
dc.contributor.authorTaschini, Lucaen
dc.date.accessioned2011-05-25-
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-29T11:19:21Z-
dc.date.available2011-06-29T11:19:21Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/46450-
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyzes the dynamic incentives for technology adoption under a transferable permits system, which allows for strategic trading on the permit market. Initially, firms can invest both in low-emitting production technologies and trade permits. In the model, technology adoption and allowance price are generated endogenously and are inter-dependent. It is shown that the non-cooperative permit trading game possesses a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, where the allowance value reflects the level of uncovered pollution (demand), the level of unused allowances (supply), and the technological status. These conditions are also satisfied when a price support instrument, which is contingent on the adoption of the new technology, is introduced. Numerical investigation confirms that this policy generates a floating price floor for the allowances, and it restores the dynamic incentives to invest. Given that this policy comes at a cost, a criterion for the selection of a self-financing policy (based on convex risk measures) is proposed and implemented.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x3399en
dc.subject.jelD80en
dc.subject.jelH20en
dc.subject.jelL50en
dc.subject.jelQ50en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.stwEmissionsrechteen
dc.subject.stwEmissionshandelen
dc.subject.stwUmweltschutzinvestitionen
dc.subject.stwTechnologiewahlen
dc.subject.stwNichtkooperatives Spielen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titlePollution permits, strategic trading and dynamic technology adoption-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn660160374en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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