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Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Watkins, William | en |
dc.contributor.author | Bohn, Henning | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2011-06-08 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2011-06-29T11:18:28Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2011-06-29T11:18:28Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2011 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46404 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper analyzes government commitments to ongoing spending programs that require future outlays. Spending commitments are important for understanding partisan politics because they constrain future governments. In a model with one government good, a 'stubborn liberal' policy maker can use precommitted spending to prevent a later conservative government from imposing decisive spending cuts. In a model where parties differ about spending priorities, reelection uncertainty creates a permanent bias towards higher government spending and higher taxes. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunich | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aCESifo Working Paper |x3462 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D72 | en |
dc.subject.jel | H40 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | government spending | en |
dc.subject.keyword | partisan politics | en |
dc.subject.keyword | political economy | en |
dc.subject.keyword | precommitment | en |
dc.subject.stw | Öffentliche Ausgaben | en |
dc.subject.stw | Regelgebundene Politik | en |
dc.subject.stw | Parteipolitik | en |
dc.subject.stw | Public Choice | en |
dc.subject.stw | Staatsquote | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Precommitted government spending and partisan politics | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 661655644 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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