Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46404
Authors: 
Watkins, William
Bohn, Henning
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo working paper: Public Finance 3462
Abstract: 
This paper analyzes government commitments to ongoing spending programs that require future outlays. Spending commitments are important for understanding partisan politics because they constrain future governments. In a model with one government good, a 'stubborn liberal' policy maker can use precommitted spending to prevent a later conservative government from imposing decisive spending cuts. In a model where parties differ about spending priorities, reelection uncertainty creates a permanent bias towards higher government spending and higher taxes.
Subjects: 
government spending
partisan politics
political economy
precommitment
JEL: 
D72
H40
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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