Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/46369 
Kompletter Metadatensatz
Erscheint in der Sammlung:
DublinCore-FeldWertSprache
dc.contributor.authorKunze, Larsen
dc.date.accessioned2011-05-24-
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-29T11:17:41Z-
dc.date.available2011-06-29T11:17:41Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/46369-
dc.description.abstractThe paper analyses how independent fiscal watchdogs (fiscal policy councils) can strengthen the incentives for fiscal discipline. By increasing fiscal transparency they can raise the awareness of the long-run costs of current deficits and increase the reputational costs for governments of violating their fiscal rules. Councils that make also normative judgements, where fiscal policy is evaluated against the government's own pre-set objectives, are likely to be more influential than councils that do only positive analysis. To fulfil their role adequately, fiscal watchdogs should be granted independence in much the same way as central banks.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x3367en
dc.subject.jelH60en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordfiscal institutionsen
dc.subject.keyworddeficit biasen
dc.subject.keywordfiscal transparencyen
dc.subject.stwFinanzpolitiken
dc.subject.stwWirtschaftspolitische Beratungen
dc.subject.stwÖffentliche Finanzkontrolleen
dc.subject.stwAutonomieen
dc.subject.stwHaushaltskonsolidierungen
dc.subject.stwEuropaen
dc.titleThe role of independent fiscal policy institutions-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn659491257en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
288.52 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.