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dc.contributor.authorLefèbvre, Mathieuen
dc.contributor.authorPestieau, Pierreen
dc.contributor.authorRiedl, Arnoen
dc.contributor.authorVilleval, Marie-Claireen
dc.date.accessioned2011-05-25-
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-29T11:17:19Z-
dc.date.available2011-06-29T11:17:19Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/46349-
dc.description.abstractIn a series of experiments conducted in Belgium (Wallonia and Flanders), France and the Netherlands, we compare behavior regarding tax evasion and welfare dodging, with and without information about others' behavior. Subjects have to decide between a 'registered' income, the realization of which will be known to the tax authority for sure, and an 'unregistered' income that will only be known with some probability. This unregistered income comes from self-employment in the Tax treatment and from black labor supplementing some unemployment compensation in the Welfare treatment. Subjects have then to decide on whether reporting their income or not, knowing the risk of detection. The results show that (i) individuals evade more in the Welfare treatment than in the Tax treatment; (ii) many subjects choose an option that allows for tax evasion or welfare fraud but report their income honestly anyway; (iii) examples of low compliance tend to increase tax evasion while examples of high compliance exert no influence; (iv) tax evasion is more frequent in France and the Netherlands; Walloons evade taxes less than the Flemish. There is no cross-country difference in welfare dodging.rformance and provide reliable estimates of the policy model coefficients associated with small central bank losses, in particular during periods of high macroeconomic uncertainty.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x3408en
dc.subject.jelH26en
dc.subject.jelH31en
dc.subject.jelI38en
dc.subject.jelC91en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordtax evasionen
dc.subject.keywordsocial frauden
dc.subject.keywordsocial comparisonsen
dc.subject.keywordcross-country comparisonsen
dc.subject.keywordexperimentsen
dc.subject.stwSteuerkriminalitäten
dc.subject.stwSteuerfluchten
dc.subject.stwSozialversicherungen
dc.subject.stwSozialhilfeen
dc.subject.stwBetrugen
dc.subject.stwNormbefolgungen
dc.subject.stwVergleichen
dc.subject.stwTesten
dc.subject.stwBelgienen
dc.subject.stwFrankreichen
dc.subject.stwNiederlandeen
dc.titleTax evasion, welfare fraud, and 'the broken windows' effect: An experiment in Belgium, France and the Netherlands-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn660141418en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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