Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/46205 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2010
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
DIW Discussion Papers No. 1028
Verlag: 
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW), Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
We apply a merchant transmission model to the trilateral market coupling (TLC) arrangement among the Netherlands, Belgium and France as a generic example, and note that it can be applied to any general market splitting or coupling of Europe's different national power markets. In this merchant framework; the system operator allocates financial transmission rights (FTRs) to investors in transmission expansion based upon their preferences, and revenue adequacy. The independent system operator (ISO) preserves some proxy FTRs to deal with potential negative externalities due to an expansion project. This scheme proves to be capable in providing incentives for investment in transmission expansion projects within TLC areas.
Schlagwörter: 
Transmission expansion
trilateral market coupling
Europe
financial transmission rights
congestion management
JEL: 
L51
L91
L94
Q40
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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