Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/44975 
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
KIT Working Paper Series in Economics No. 15
Publisher: 
Karlsruher Institut für Technologie (KIT), Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre (ECON), Karlsruhe
Abstract: 
Our study analyzes theories of learning for strategic interactions in networks. Participants played two of the 2 x 2 games used by Selten and Chmura (2008) and in the comment by Brunner, Camerer and Goeree (2009). Every participant played against four neighbors and could choose a different strategy against each of them. The games were played in two network structures: a lattice and a circle. We compare our results with the predictions of different theories (Nash equilibrium, quantal response equilibrium, action-sampling equilibrium, payoff-sampling equilibrium, and impulse balance equilibrium) and the experimental results of Selten and Chmura (2008). One result is that the majority of players choose the same strategy against each neighbor. As another result we observe an order of predictive success for the stationary concepts that is different from the order shown by Selten and Chmura. This result supports our view that learning in networks is different from learning in random matching.
Subjects: 
experimental economics
networks
learning
JEL: 
C70
C73
C91
D83
D85
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.