Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/44527 
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
ETLA Discussion Papers No. 1216
Publisher: 
The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy (ETLA), Helsinki
Abstract: 
This paper explores performance measurement in incentive plans. Based on theory, we argue that differences in the nature of jobs between blue- and white-collar employees lead to differences in incentive systems. We find that performance measurement for white-collar workers is broader in terms of the performance measures, the organizational level of performance measurement and the time horizon. The intensity of incentives is also stronger for white-collar employees. All of these findings are consistent with theory.
Subjects: 
Incentive pay
performance measurement
risk versus distortion trade-off
agency theory
JEL: 
J33
M52
M54
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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