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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2010
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
21st European Regional Conference of the International Telecommunications Society (ITS): "Telecommunications at New Crossroads: Changing Value Configurations, User Roles, and Regulation", Copenhagen, Denmark, 13th-15th September 2010 No. 34
Verlag: 
International Telecommunications Society (ITS), Calgary
Zusammenfassung: 
Typically, incumbent providers enjoy a demand-side advantage over any entrant. However, market entrants may enjoy a supply-side advantage in costs over the incumbent, since they are more efficient or operate on innovative technologies, such as the voice of internet protocol (VoIP) telephony. Regulation with a supply-side asymmetry has rarely been addressed. Considering both a supply-side and a demand- side asymmetry, the present model analyzes the effects different regulation regimes. Regulation may have adverse effects on subscribers, market shares, and profits. If providers can discriminate between on-net and off-net prices, asymmetric regulation has no local effect on market shares, independent of any demand- and supply-side asymmetry. Otherwise, with reciprocal termination charges, price discrimination leads to qualitatively same effects than nondiscriminatory pricing.
Schlagwörter: 
Termination charges
Interconnection
Regulation
Price Discrimination
Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP)
JEL: 
L13
L51
L96
Dokumentart: 
Conference Paper

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