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dc.contributor.authorRebitzer, James B.en
dc.contributor.authorTaylor, Lowell J.en
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-04-
dc.date.accessioned2011-02-11T14:30:48Z-
dc.date.available2011-02-11T14:30:48Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/44234-
dc.description.abstractEmployers structure pay and employment relationships to mitigate agency problems. A large literature in economics documents how the resolution of these problems shapes personnel policies and labor markets. For the most part, the study of agency in employment relationships relies on highly stylized assumptions regarding human motivation, e.g., that employees seek to earn as much money as possible with minimal effort. In this essay, we explore the consequences of introducing behavioral complexity and realism into models of agency within organizations. Specifically, we assess the insights gained by allowing employees to be guided by such motivations as the desire to compare favorably to others, the aspiration to contribute to intrinsically worthwhile goals, and the inclination to reciprocate generosity or exact retribution for perceived wrongs. More provocatively, from the standpoint of standard economics, we also consider the possibility that people are driven, in ways that may be opaque even to themselves, by the desire to earn social esteem or to shape and reinforce identity.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x5058en
dc.subject.jelD2en
dc.subject.jelJ0en
dc.subject.jelM5en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordagencyen
dc.subject.keywordmotivationen
dc.subject.keywordemployment relationshipsen
dc.subject.keywordbehavioral economicsen
dc.subject.stwArbeitsverhältnisen
dc.subject.stwLeistungsanreizen
dc.subject.stwPrinzipal-Agent-Theorieen
dc.subject.stwMotivationen
dc.subject.stwArbeitsverhaltenen
dc.subject.stwVerhaltensökonomiken
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleExtrinsic rewards and intrinsic motives: Standard and behavioral approaches to agency and labor markets-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn638483174en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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