Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/44100 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
1997
Series/Report no.: 
WZB Discussion Paper No. FS I 97-302
Publisher: 
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB), Berlin
Abstract: 
Codetermination (Mitbestimmung) in (West) Germany has been one of the mostcontroversial areas of political and economic conflict. When the CDU-led coalition came to power in 1982, there was a widespread expectation that the powers and privileges enjoyed by works councils (which had been significantly extended by the outgoing coalition of Social Democrats and Liberals) would be restricted. The only significant legislative assault on the institutions of Mitbestimmung, however, came inthe form of two relatively minor initiatives - to reform works council electoral law(Minderheitenrechte) and to set up representative bodies for 'middle management'within firms (Sprecherausschüsse). Despite strong backing from various elementswithin the coalition, however, these proposals, although eventually approved by Parliament, were significantly diluted in the consultative process, and in their final form have had almost no impact.This paper examines the passage of these two proposals as a way of addressing thebroader question of why 'neoliberalism' (in particular the anti-union agenda) made solittle progress in West Germany during the 1980s. It rejects the common political science explanation that policy radicalism in Germany is inhibited by federalism and a culture of consensual policy-making. In its place, it suggests two factors that are responsible for frustrating radical change. Firstly, the complex bargaining betweencoalition partners that was required to construct a legislative majority entailed aseries of trade-offs that watered down the main thrust of the two proposals. Secondly, more significantly (and from an Anglo-American perspective more surprisingly), German employers were opposedto the very reforms that theconservative government claimed would advantage them. This opposition can onlybe understood by examining the distinctive incentives and constraints facingemployers in a co-ordinated production regime
Abstract (Translated): 
Unter allen wirtschaftlichen und politischen Auseinandersetzungen in Deutschland wurde von jeher der Streit um die Mitbestimmung am heftigsten geführt. Als 1982 die CDU-geführte Koalition an die Macht kam, war die Erwartung weit verbreitet, daß Einfluß und Vorrechte der Betriebsräte (die noch kurz vor ihrem Ende von der sozialliberalen Koalition beträchtlich ausgeweitet worden waren) nun deutlich eingeschränkt werden würden. Doch es kam anders: Der einzige gesetzgeberische Versuch von einiger Bedeutung gegen das Regelwerk der Mitbestimmung wurdedurch zwei nicht "ins Herz" der Mitbestimmung zielende Initiativen vorgetragen: die Minderheitenrechte regelnden Bestimmungen zu den Betriebsratswahlen zuverändern und als Vertretungsorgane für das Mittelmanagement sog. Sprecherausschüsse einzuführen. Trotz großer Unterstützung von seiten der Koalition wurden diese Vorschläge, obwohl vom Parlament bereits verabschiedet, im Gesetzgebungsverfahren entscheidend abgeschwächt und hatten so im Endeffekt fast keine Wirkung mehr
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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