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dc.contributor.authorDimitrov, Dinkoen
dc.date.accessioned2008-07-24-
dc.date.accessioned2011-01-24T10:24:03Z-
dc.date.available2011-01-24T10:24:03Z-
dc.date.issued2005-
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:hbz:361-8232en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/43838-
dc.description.abstractThe top coalition property of Banerjee et al. (2001) and the common ranking property of Farrell and Scotchmer (1988) are sufficient conditions for core stability in hedonic games. We introduce the semistrict core as a stronger stability concept than the core, and show that the top coalition property guarantees the existence of semistrictly core stable coalition structures. Moreover, for each game satisfying the common ranking property, the core and the semistrict core coincide.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aBielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics (IMW) |cBielefelden
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Papers |x377en
dc.subject.jelD72en
dc.subject.jelC71en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordCoalition formationen
dc.subject.keywordCommon ranking propertyen
dc.subject.keywordHedonic gamesen
dc.subject.keywordSemistrict coreen
dc.subject.keywordTop coalition propertyen
dc.titleOn top coalitions, common rankings, and semistrict core stability-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn572499132en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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