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Title:Two support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution in small object division markets PDF Logo
Authors:Haake, Claus-Jochen
Issue Date:2005
Series/Report no.:Working papers // Institute of Mathematical Economics 366
Abstract:We discuss two support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution in the context of an object division problem involving two agents. Allocations of objects resulting from strategic interaction are obtained as a demand vector in a specific market. For the first support result games in strategic form are derived that exhibit a unique Nash equilibrium. The second result uses subgame perfect equlibria of a game in extensive form. Although there may be multiple equilibria, coordination problems can be removed.
Subjects:support result
object division
Kalai-Smorodinsky solution
Persistent Identifier of the first edition:urn:nbn:de:hbz:361-7012
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Working Papers, Institute of Mathematical Economics, Universität Bielefeld

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