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dc.contributor.authorDimitrov, Dinkoen
dc.contributor.authorHaake, Claus-Jochenen
dc.date.accessioned2008-07-23-
dc.date.accessioned2011-01-24T10:23:30Z-
dc.date.available2011-01-24T10:23:30Z-
dc.date.issued2006-
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:hbz:361-9850en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/43807-
dc.description.abstractWe consider the class of proper monotonic simple games and study coalition formation when an exogenous weight vector and a solution concept are combined to guide the distribution power within winning coalitions. These distributions induce players' preferences over coalitions in a hedonic game. We formalize the notion of semistrict core stability, which is stronger than the standard core concept but weaker than the strict core notion and derive two characterization results for the semistrict core, dependent on conditions we impose on the solution concept. It turns out that a bounded power condition, which connects exogenous weights and the solution, is crucial. It generalizes a condition termed 'absence of the paradox of smaller coalitions' that was previously used to derive core existence results.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aBielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics (IMW) |cBielefelden
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Papers |x378en
dc.subject.jelD72en
dc.subject.jelC71en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordCoalition formationen
dc.subject.keywordSemistrict coreen
dc.subject.keywordSimple gamesen
dc.subject.keywordWinning coalitionsen
dc.subject.stwKoalitionen
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen
dc.subject.stwCoreen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleStable governments and the semistrict core. Revised version of 'Coalition formation in simple games: the semistrict core'-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn572383568en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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