Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/43790
Authors: 
Shellshear, Evan
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
Working papers // Institute of Mathematical Economics 387
Abstract: 
This paper investigates conditions under which the core of a TU cooperative game is stable. In particular the author extends the idea of extendability to find new conditions under which the core is stable. It is also shown that these new conditions are not necessary for core stability.
Subjects: 
Core stability
Stable core
Extendability
JEL: 
C71
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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