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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2009
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Papers No. 420
Verlag: 
Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics (IMW), Bielefeld
Zusammenfassung: 
We study a communication game of common interest in which the sender observes one of infinite types and sends one of finite messages which is interpreted by the receiver. In equilibrium there is no full separation but types are clustered into convex categories. We give a full characterization of the strict Nash equilibria of this game by representing these categories by Voronoi languages. As the strategy set is infinite static stability concepts for finite games such as ESS are no longer sufficient for Lyapunov stability in the replicator dynamics. We give examples of unstable strict Nash equilibria and stable inefficient Voronoi languages. We derive efficient Voronoi languages with a large number of categories and numerically illustrate stability of some Voronoi languages with large message spaces and non-uniformly distributed types.
Schlagwörter: 
Cheap talk
Signaling game
Communication game
Dynamic stability
Voronoi tesselation
JEL: 
C72
C73
D82
D83
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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