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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2005
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Papers No. 372
Verlag: 
Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics (IMW), Bielefeld
Zusammenfassung: 
We consider general two-sided matching markets, so-called matching with contracts markets as introduced by Hatfield and Milgrom (2005), and analyze (Maskin) monotonic and Nash implementable solutions. We show that for matching with contracts markets the stable correspondence is monotonic and implementable (Theorems 1 and 3). Furthermore, any solution that is Pareto efficient, individually rational, and monotonic is a supersolution of the stable correspondence (Theorem 2). In other words, the stable correspondence is the minimal solution that is Pareto efficient, individually rational, and implementable.
Schlagwörter: 
Matching with Contracts
(Maskin) Monotonicity
Nash implementation
Stability
JEL: 
C62
C78
D78
J41
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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