Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/43763 
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
Working Papers No. 374
Publisher: 
Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics (IMW), Bielefeld
Abstract: 
We are concerned with the problem of core membership testing for hedonic coalition formation games, which is to decide whether a certain coalition structure belongs to the core of a given game. We show that this problem is co-NP complete when players' preferences are additive.
Subjects: 
Additivity
Coalition formation
Core
Co-NP completeness
Hedonic games
JEL: 
C71
C63
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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