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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2010
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Nota di Lavoro No. 2010,122
Verlag: 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milano
Zusammenfassung: 
We study hedonic games with heterogeneous player types that reflect her nationality, ethnic background, or skill type. Agents' preferences are dictated by status-seeking where status can be either local or global. The two dimensions of status define the two components of a generalized constant elasticity of substitution utility function. In this setting, we characterize the core as a function of the utility's parameter values and show that in all cases the corresponding cores are non-empty. We further discuss the core stable outcomes in terms of their segregating versus integrating properties.
Schlagwörter: 
Coalitions
Core
Stability
Status-seeking
JEL: 
C78
J41
D71
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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