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dc.contributor.authorMondello, Gérarden
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-25-
dc.date.accessioned2010-12-22T10:43:13Z-
dc.date.available2010-12-22T10:43:13Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/43507-
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies the delegation of activities that pose serious risks to health and the environment in an economy regulated by strict liability schemes. Strict liability induces judgment-proof possibilities. Two civil liability regimes are then compared: a strict liability scheme and a capped strict liability one. The argument is led under a twofold asymmetric information assumption between the principal and the agent: the efficiency level in effort for safety and the agent's level of wealth. The paper shows that standard strict liability under information asymmetries deters the efficient agent to compete and favors adverse selection. Then, under conditions, a capped strict liability regime is a better regime than a standard strict liability one because it induces the efficient agent to supply the level of safety effort equivalent to the first best solution. The counterpart is the perception of an informational rent by the efficient agent. At the optimum, this rent is minimized by the efficient contract supplied by the principal.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) |cMilanoen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aNota di Lavoro |x2010,103en
dc.subject.jelK0en
dc.subject.jelK32en
dc.subject.jelQ01en
dc.subject.jelQ58en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordEnvironmenten
dc.subject.keywordStrict Liabilityen
dc.subject.keywordEx-Ante Regulationen
dc.subject.keywordEx-Post Liabilityen
dc.subject.keywordJudgment-Proofen
dc.subject.keywordEnvironment Lawen
dc.subject.keywordCERCLAen
dc.subject.keywordEnvironmental Liabilityen
dc.titleRisky activities and strict liability rules: delegating safe-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn640615732en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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