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dc.contributor.authorKushnir, Alexeyen
dc.date.accessioned2010-12-01-
dc.date.accessioned2010-12-22T10:42:39Z-
dc.date.available2010-12-22T10:42:39Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/43475-
dc.description.abstractSome labor markets have recently developed formal signalling mechanisms, e.g. the signalling for interviews in the job market for new Ph.D. economists. We evaluate the effect of such mechanisms on two-sided matching markets by considering a game of incomplete information between firms and workers. Workers have almost aligned preferences over firms: each worker has 'typical' commonly known preferences with probability close to one and 'atypical' idiosyncratic preferences with the complementary probability close to zero. Firms have some commonly known preferences over workers. We show that the introduction of a signalling mechanism is harmful for this environment. Though signals transmit previously unavailable information, they also facilitate information asymmetry that leads to coordination failures. As a result, the introduction of a signalling mechanism lessens the expected number of matches when signals are informative.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) |cMilanoen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aNota di Lavoro |x2010,121en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelC78en
dc.subject.jelD80en
dc.subject.jelJ44en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordSignalingen
dc.subject.keywordCheaptalken
dc.subject.keywordMatchingen
dc.titleHarmful signaling in matching markets-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn640802680en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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