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dc.contributor.authorKossioris, Georgiosen
dc.contributor.authorPlexousakis, Michaelen
dc.contributor.authorXepapadeas, Anastasiosen
dc.contributor.authorde Zeeuw, Aarten
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-25-
dc.date.accessioned2010-12-22T10:42:04Z-
dc.date.available2010-12-22T10:42:04Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/43444-
dc.description.abstractRecent research developments in common-pool resource models emphasize the importance of links with ecological systems and the presence of non-linearities, thresholds and multiple steady states. In a recent paper Kossioris et al. (2008) develop a methodology for deriving feedback Nash equilibria for non-linear differential games and apply this methodology to a common-pool resource model of a lake where pollution corresponds to benefits and at the same time affects the ecosystem services. This paper studies the structure of optimal state- dependent taxes that steer the combined economic-ecological system towards the trajectory of optimal management, and provides an algorithm for calculating such taxes.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) |cMilanoen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aNota di Lavoro |x2010,101en
dc.subject.jelQ25en
dc.subject.jelC73en
dc.subject.jelC61en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordDifferential Gamesen
dc.subject.keywordnon-linear Feedback Nash Equilibriaen
dc.subject.keywordEcosystemsen
dc.subject.keywordOptimal State-dependent Taxen
dc.titleOn the optimal taxation of common-pool resources-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn64061485Xen
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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