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Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Kossioris, Georgios | en |
dc.contributor.author | Plexousakis, Michael | en |
dc.contributor.author | Xepapadeas, Anastasios | en |
dc.contributor.author | de Zeeuw, Aart | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-11-25 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-12-22T10:42:04Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2010-12-22T10:42:04Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2010 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/43444 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Recent research developments in common-pool resource models emphasize the importance of links with ecological systems and the presence of non-linearities, thresholds and multiple steady states. In a recent paper Kossioris et al. (2008) develop a methodology for deriving feedback Nash equilibria for non-linear differential games and apply this methodology to a common-pool resource model of a lake where pollution corresponds to benefits and at the same time affects the ecosystem services. This paper studies the structure of optimal state- dependent taxes that steer the combined economic-ecological system towards the trajectory of optimal management, and provides an algorithm for calculating such taxes. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aFondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) |cMilano | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aNota di Lavoro |x2010,101 | en |
dc.subject.jel | Q25 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C73 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C61 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Differential Games | en |
dc.subject.keyword | non-linear Feedback Nash Equilibria | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Ecosystems | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Optimal State-dependent Tax | en |
dc.title | On the optimal taxation of common-pool resources | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 64061485X | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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