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dc.contributor.authorHuang, Rachel J.en
dc.contributor.authorMuermann, Alexanderen
dc.contributor.authorTzeng, Larry Y.en
dc.date.accessioned2009-05-06-
dc.date.accessioned2010-12-15T09:22:39Z-
dc.date.available2010-12-15T09:22:39Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:hebis:30-60654en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/43256-
dc.description.abstractWe examine insurance markets with two types of customers: those who regret suboptimal decisions and those who don.t. In this setting, we characterize the equilibria under hidden information about the type of customers and hidden action. We show that both pooling and separating equilibria can exist. Furthermore, there exist separating equilibria that predict a positive correlation between the amount of insurance coverage and risk type, as in the standard economic models of adverse selection, but there also exist separating equilibria that predict a negative correlation between the amount of insurance coverage and risk type, i.e. advantageous selection. Since optimal choice of regretful customers depends on foregone alternatives, any equilibrium includes a contract which is oþered but not purchased.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aGoethe University Frankfurt, Center for Financial Studies (CFS) |cFrankfurt a. M.en
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCFS Working Paper |x2008/38en
dc.subject.jelD03en
dc.subject.jelD81en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordAsymmetric Informationen
dc.subject.keywordRegreten
dc.subject.keywordInsuranceen
dc.subject.stwVersicherungsmarkten
dc.subject.stwAsymmetrische Informationen
dc.subject.stwAdverse Selectionen
dc.subject.stwVersicherungsökonomiken
dc.subject.stwEntscheidung bei Risikoen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleHidden regret in insurance markets: Adverse and advantageous selection-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn599233354en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:cfswop:200838en

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