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dc.contributor.authorDannenberg, Astriden
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-04T10:49:11Z-
dc.date.available2010-11-04T10:49:11Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/41439-
dc.description.abstractThis paper experimentally analyzes the effects if signatories to an international environmental agreement (IEA) apply different voting schemes to determine the terms of the agreement. To this end, unanimity, qualified majority voting, and simple majority voting are compared with respect to the resulting pollution abatement level and social welfare. At first sight in line with theoretical predictions, the experiment shows that the change of the voting scheme implemented in an IEA does not significantly change social welfare. However, changing the majority required to determine the terms of an IEA alters the 'depth and breadth' of cooperation. The coalitions under the unanimity rule are relatively large and implement moderate effort levels while the coalitions with majority votes implement very high effort levels but attract only few participants.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aZentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) |cMannheimen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aZEW Discussion Papers |x10-072en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelC92en
dc.subject.jelD71en
dc.subject.jelH41en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordinternational environmental agreementsen
dc.subject.keywordcooperation, votingen
dc.subject.stwUmweltabkommenen
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungstheorieen
dc.subject.stwAbstimmungsregelen
dc.subject.stwSoziale Wohlfahrtsfunktionen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleVoting in international environmental agreements: Experimental evidence from the lab-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn636387585en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:zewdip:10072en

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