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dc.contributor.authorNormann, Hans-Theoen
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-02T09:15:40Z-
dc.date.available2010-11-02T09:15:40Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.isbn978-3-86304-004-8en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/41417-
dc.description.abstractThe hypothesis that vertically integrated firms have an incentive to foreclose the input market because foreclosure raises its downstream rivals' costs is the subject of much controversy in the theoretical industrial organization literature. A powerful argument against this hypothesis is that, absent commitment, such foreclosure cannot occur in Nash equilibrium. The laboratory data reported in this paper provide experimental evidence in favor of the hypothesis. Markets with a vertically integrated firm are signifiantly less competitive than those where firms are separate. While the experimental results violate the standard equilibrium notion, they are consistent with the quantalresponse generalization of Nash equilibrium.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aHeinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE) |cDüsseldorfen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDICE Discussion Paper |x05en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelC90en
dc.subject.jelD43en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordexperimental economicsen
dc.subject.keywordforeclosureen
dc.subject.keywordquantal response equilibriumen
dc.subject.keywordraising rival's costsen
dc.subject.keywordvertical integrationen
dc.subject.stwKartellen
dc.subject.stwVertikale Konzentrationen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen
dc.subject.stwTesten
dc.titleVertical mergers, foreclosure and raising rivals' costs: Experimental evidence-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn637981545en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:dicedp:05en

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