Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/4115 
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 2835
Publisher: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
This paper analyses theoretically and empirically how employment subsidies should be targeted. We contrast measures involving targeting workers with low incomes/abilities and targeting the unemployed under the criteria of approximate welfare efficiency (AWE). Thereby we can identify policies that (a) improve employment and welfare, (b) do not raise earnings inequality and (c) are self-financing. We construct a microfounded, dynamic model of hiring and separations and calibrate it with German data. The calibration shows that hiring vouchers can be AWE, while low-wage subsidies do not satisfy AWE. Furthermore, hiring vouchers targeted at the long-term unemployed are more effective than those targeted at low-ability workers.
Subjects: 
Hiring voucher
Targeting
Employment
Unemployment
Duration
Self-financing
Low wage subsidy
JEL: 
J23
J68
J38
J64
J24
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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