Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/41078
Authors: 
Kessing, Sebastian G.
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge // Universität Siegen, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Wirtschaftsinformatik und Wirtschaftsrecht 130
Abstract: 
This study analyzes the interaction between distorted election choices and the architecture of government with a focus on the implications for the accountability of politicians. Contrasting centralized with decentralized political systems, it is shown that centralization is likely to result in higher accountability if election choices are subject to small random distortions. Furthermore, equity and efficiency arguments for uniform policies in centralized systems are derived as these are likely to result in the better overall performance of politicians and in more equal performance across regions.
Subjects: 
accountability
federalism
decentralization
retrospective voting
JEL: 
H73
D72
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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