Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/40675
Authors: 
Mauleon, Ana
Vannetelbosch, Vincent
Vergote, Wouter
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: CTN, Coalition theory network 2008,29
Abstract: 
We adopt the notion of von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets to predict which matchings are possibly stable when agents are farsighted in one-to-one matching problems. We provide the characterization of von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets: a set of matchings is a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set if and only if it is a singleton set and its element is a corewise stable matching. Thus, contrary to the von Neumann-Morgenstern (myopically) stable sets, von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets cannot include matchings that are not corewise stable ones. Moreover, we show that our main result is robust to many- to-one matching problems with responsive preferences.
Subjects: 
Matching Problem
von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets
Farsighted Stability
JEL: 
C71
C78
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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