Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/40670
Authors: 
Zhao, Jingang
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: CTN, Coalition theory network 2008,27
Abstract: 
This paper first establishes a new core theorem using the concept of generated payoffs: the TU (transferable utility) core is empty if and only if the maximum of generated payoffs (mgp) is greater than the grand coalition's payoff v(N), or if and only if it is irrational to split v(N). It then provides answers to the questions of what payoffs to split, how to split the payoff, what coalitions to form, and how long each of the coalitions will be formed by rational players in coalitional TU games. Finally, it obtains analogous results in coalitional NTU (non-transferable utility) games.
Subjects: 
Coalition Formation
Core
Maximal Payoff
Minimum No-Blocking Payoff
JEL: 
C62
C71
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
213.36 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.