Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/40001 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2010
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Hannover 2010 No. 40
Verlag: 
Verein für Socialpolitik, Ausschuss für Entwicklungsländer, Göttingen
Zusammenfassung: 
Intrinsic motivation of workers may arise from different individual motives. While some workers care about the mission of an organization and derive an intrinsic benefit from advancing this mission ("good" workers), others derive pleasure from some form of destructive or anti-social behavior ("bad" workers). We show that mission-oriented organizations can take advantage of the intrinsic motivation of good workers. Compared to profit-oriented organizations, lower bonus payments and lower monitoring are necessary in order to achieve a high output. However, as soon as there are bad workers, mission-oriented organizations may become more vulnerable to their anti-social behavior than profit-oriented organizations. We analyze the optimal wage contracts and monitoring levels for both types of organization and discuss appropriate measures of ex ante candidate screening to overcome the problems caused by bad workers.
Schlagwörter: 
motivated agents
non-profit
sabotage
candidate selection
JEL: 
D21
D23
L31
Dokumentart: 
Conference Paper

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