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dc.contributor.authorDiTella, Rafaelen
dc.contributor.authorMacCulloch, Roberten
dc.date.accessioned2010-09-01T09:48:00Z-
dc.date.available2010-09-01T09:48:00Z-
dc.date.issued1999-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/39562-
dc.description.abstractWe study the problem of unemployment benefit provision when the family is also aprovider of social insurance. As a benchmark, a simple model is presented where risksharingmotives govern intra-family transfers and more generous unemploymentbenefits, provided by the State, crowd out family risk-sharing arrangements one-forone.The model is then extended to capture the idea that the State has an advantagevis-a-vis the family in the provision of insurance because it can tax individuals,whereas the family must rely on self-enforcing agreements. In this case, the effect ofState transfers on intra-family transfers is found to be more than one-for-one. Thus,somewhat perversely, both informal transfers and total insurance transfers to theunemployed fall as the State's generosity increases. This does not imply that theoptimal Welfare State is zero. Our results still hold when families are assumed to bebetter than the State at monitoring the job search activities of the unemployed.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aRheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn, Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung (ZEI) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aZEI Working Paper |xB 23-1999en
dc.subject.jelH42en
dc.subject.jelH53en
dc.subject.jelD1en
dc.subject.jelI38en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordSelf-enforcing contractsen
dc.subject.keywordOptimal welfare generosityen
dc.subject.stwSozialstaaten
dc.subject.stwArbeitslosenversicherungen
dc.subject.stwFamilieen
dc.subject.stwPrivater Transferen
dc.subject.stwSelbsthilfeen
dc.subject.stwCrowding outen
dc.titleInformal family insurance and the design of the welfare state-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn825506530en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:zeiwps:B231999en

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