Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/39559 
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-FeldWertSprache
dc.contributor.authorCavallari, Liliaen
dc.date.accessioned2010-09-01T09:47:54Z-
dc.date.available2010-09-01T09:47:54Z-
dc.date.issued2001-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/39559-
dc.description.abstractBuilding on a micro-founded model of a two region-world economyin the tradition of the new open economy literature, this paperanalyses the strategic interaction of large wage-setters and the centralbank when switching from a regime of uncoordinated national monetarypolicies to a monetary union. The establishment of a monetaryunion is shown to favour wage restraint, provided the uni…ed centralbank is not too conservative. Wage discipline may reduce equilibriumin‡ation in a monetary union relative to the one under uncoordinatednational monetary policies when wage setting is centralisedacross member countries.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aRheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn, Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung (ZEI) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aZEI Working Paper |xB 11-2001en
dc.subject.jelE5en
dc.subject.jelF4en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordmonetary unionen
dc.subject.keywordwage bargainingen
dc.subject.keywordinflationary biasen
dc.subject.stwWährungsunionen
dc.subject.stwInflationen
dc.subject.stwLohnverhandlungstheorieen
dc.subject.stwGeldpolitiken
dc.subject.stwInternationale wirtschaftspolitische Koordinationen
dc.titleInflationary performance in a monetary union with large wage setters-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn824443470en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:zeiwps:B112001en

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
359.22 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.