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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2001
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ZEI Working Paper No. B 22-2001
Verlag: 
Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn, Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung (ZEI), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
The literature on tax competition generally concludes that international coordination of capital taxes among symmetric countries increases tax rates. This paper investigates whether this conclusion also holds in a political economy framework where taxes are set by elected policy makers. It shows that policy makers are fiscally more liberal than the average citizen if taxes are set non-cooperatively. However, fiscally more conservative policy makers are elected if taxes are set cooperatively. The introduction of tax coordination cannot remove the incentive to compete for foreign capital, but simply shifts it to the election stage. The paper proves that with standard specifications of the utility functions, coordination leads to lower tax rates than competition.
Schlagwörter: 
Tax competition
tax coordination
strategic delegation
JEL: 
H2
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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