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dc.contributor.authorAngerhausen, Juliaen
dc.date.accessioned2009-11-02-
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-31T12:15:04Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-31T12:15:04Z-
dc.date.issued2005-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/39442-
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyzes the bahavior of a principal with bounded memory who can offer a two-period performance-based contract to an agent. In the model he can choose whether to evaluate the agent after each period or only at the end of the second period. If the agent is wealth-constrained, the option to evaluate him twice can be profitable. But without the constraint on the part of the agent, the principal will always prefer to evaluate only once in order to reduce evaluation costs. Finally we consider a modification leads us to a trade-off between more and less frequent evaluations.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversität Dortmund, Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät |cDortmunden
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWirtschaftstheoretische Diskussionsbeiträge |x05-06en
dc.subject.jelM12en
dc.subject.jelJ33en
dc.subject.jelD86en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordPerformance evaluationsen
dc.subject.keywordbounded memoryen
dc.subject.keywordincentive contractsen
dc.titleEvaluation frequency and forgetful principals-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn611994569en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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