Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/39250
Authors: 
Theuringer, Martin
Weiss, Pia
Year of Publication: 
2001
Series/Report no.: 
IWP Discussion Paper 2001/3
Abstract: 
We discuss the effects of AD-protection in a standard Dixit model of entry deterrence. In an AD-regime, the newcomer is constrained by a minimum-price rule in addition to existing irreversible entrance costs. For minimum prices which lie below the Stackelberg one, we find that AD-rules distort competition. We show that AD-protection increases the advantages of entry deterrence for a wide range of combinations of sunk costs and minimum prices. When entrance costs are high, consumer welfare is lower in an AD- regime than under free trade. Consequently, AD-protection facilitates the abuse of market dominance.
Subjects: 
Anti-dumping
abuse of market dominance
strategic firm behaviour
JEL: 
F14
L40
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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