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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2010
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 2986
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
We analyse optimal environmental policies in a market that is vertically differentiated in terms of the energy efficiency of products. Considering energy taxes, subsidies to firms for investment in more eco-friendly products, and product standards, we are particularly interested in how distributional goals in addition to environmental goals shape the choice of policy instruments. Surprisingly, we find that an industry-friendly government levies an energy tax to supplement a lax product standard, but shies away from subsidies to firms. By contrast, a consumer-friendly government relies heavily on a strict product standard and in addition implements a moderate subsidy to firms, but avoids energy taxes.
Schlagwörter: 
energy tax
energy efficiency standard
subsidy
vertically differentiated markets
product quality
JEL: 
Q58
Q48
L13
L15
L50
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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