Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/38978
Authors: 
Kube, Sebastian
Traxler, Christian
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo working paper Public Finance 3091
Abstract: 
Although legal sanctions are often non-deterrent, we frequently observe compliance with 'mild laws'. A possible explanation is that the incentives to comply are shaped not only by legal, but also by social sanctions. This paper employs a novel experimental approach to study the link between legal and social norm enforcement. We analyze whether the two institutions are complements or substitutes. Our results show that legal sanctions partially crowd out social norm enforcement. The welfare effect from mild laws is positive, however, as a higher level of compliance is achieved at lower enforcement costs.
Subjects: 
social sanctions
legal sanctions
norm enforcement
mild laws
laboratory experiment
VCM
public goods
JEL: 
K42
C90
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
321.23 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.